ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

80-0121

SUBJECT: (Optional) Discussion/Dinner, "The Stability of Egypt at Peace," Thursday, 24 January 1980

FROM: [redacted] Coordinator for Academic Relations, NFAC

EXTENSION [redacted]

NO.

DATE 9 January 1980

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DCI (For Information)	rec'd 11 Jan. 80	24 JAN 1980	JD	Please recall that John Stein said Bob Ames should serve as DDO rep. Bruce Clarke [redacted] and Dick Lehman will all be engaged in the NFAC planning conference on 24 Jan. Jim
2. NFAC/CAR				
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9 January 1980

21 JAN 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : Coordinator for Academic Relations, NFAC

SUBJECT : Discussion/Dinner, "The Stability of Egypt at Peace," Thursday, 24 January 1980

1. On the Director's behalf, you are invited to participate in a discussion/dinner on the above subject in the DCI conference room (7D64) on the date appointed. Our intention is to take advantage of the comparative lull in Egypt's affairs at the moment to improve our understanding and, if possible, to prepare ourselves for the next change in that climate. The items attached may serve as background reading.

2. The following have been invited from the outside:

Professor Richard Mitchell, University of Michigan
Professor (and former Ambassador) Herman Eilts, Boston University
Dr. William B. Quandt, The Brookings Institution

Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders
Dr. Robert Hunter, NSC Staff
Mr. Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA

3. Our discussion will begin with brief (fifteen minute) statements from our academic guests. Thereafter we shall all join in a free exchange.

4. The plan for the evening is as follows: The company will assemble in the DCI conference room between 5:30 and 6:00. Refreshments will be served. Our discussion will begin at 6:00 and continue until 8:30 or thereabouts. If you are unable to attend, please call extension [redacted]

25X1

STAT

[redacted]

Attachment

SUBJECT: Discussion/Dinner, "The Stability of Egypt at Peace," Thursday, 24 January 1980

Distribution:
1 - DCI (Information)
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/NFA (Information)
1 - NIO/NESA
STAT 1 - A/NIO/NESA - [redacted]
STAT 1 - DD/OPA, [redacted]
1 - OPA/ME, J. Helgerson
STAT 1 - OPA/ME, [redacted]
1 - OER, [redacted]
1 - NFAC/CAR (Information)

Middle East Review
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A Return to the Veil in Egypt

By John Alden Williams

Since the eleventh century at least, the Muslim women of Egypt have been known for attitudes freer than those of women of other Muslim countries. It has been noted that they were stronger in character, more fearless, more likely to demand sexual gratification, despite the obvious difficulties put in their way by their society, more likely to bully their husbands and to use strong language. Egyptian women were the first in the Arab world to call for putting aside the veil (in the 1920s) and for admission to the universities (in the 1930s). Since then, most occupational and professional restraints on women have been removed. It is true that the *legal* position of women in Egypt lags well behind that of Iraqi, Tunisian, Syrian or Jordanian women. An Egyptian woman is not protected against her husband's taking another wife against her wishes or against his summarily divorcing her (with payment of a token maintenance for one year only). Nonetheless, the social gains of Egyptian women have been impressive, and many American women might envy them. Egyptian women are doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects, managers of companies, deans of university faculties and cabinet ministers. They receive equal pay for equal work, rarely meet with discrimination in their jobs and usually retain their maiden names after marriage. They are admitted to institutions of higher studies entirely on the basis of their academic merits in a fully competitive way with men.

Already well-launched among upper-class Egyptian women by the time of the Egyptian revolution of 1952, the cause of *tahrir al-mar'a* (woman's liberation) spread to the middle and lower-classes during the Nasserist period, from 1953 to 1967, particularly in the cities. Women took a more public role in a society dedicated to modernization, and many of them laid aside traditional dress. This was especially true, of course, among the youth, on the campuses of the universities and in the Egyptianized business and professional sectors. It became rare to see a veil and common to see Egyptian imitations of most recent Western dress, including the mini-skirt. Even in the smaller provincial towns, women advertised their attachment to modernity by adopting forms of dress regarded as contemporary, international and modern. Nowhere else in the Arab world, except possibly in Lebanon, did Muslim women seem less to present their traditional image, of swathed, mysterious beings from a second, private world that only just impinged on the public world of men. It was rather generally assumed that this was the way it should and would be: Egyptian women were demonstrating how the Arab woman of the future would behave and dress. Women who continued to go out with the black *milaya'* cloaking their forms and drawn over their heads were pityingly or contemptuously referred to as *baladi giddan* (very provincial) and were looked upon as backward anomalies, or as mere peasants with quaint, disappearing manners. Women in Western dress, if this showed restraint and modesty, were not regarded as in any way "less Muslim" than others; certainly, they were viewed as pious and observant in other matters, such as pilgrimage, prayer, fasting and the reading of scripture. If questioned on their views as to dress, orthodox women in "modern dress" denied that there was anything un-Islamic about this, provided the dress was not gaudy and/or abbreviated. They argued that early Islam had not segregated or veiled women—except perhaps in the case of the Prophet's wives,

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Dr. Williams is Professor of Islamic Art and History at the American University in Cairo, and (in alternating years) in the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas in Austin. He is the author of *Islam* (George Braziller, Inc., 1961) and *Themes of Islamic Civilization* (University of California Press, 1971).

and then because his wives lived in a very public place; in rooms along the side of his mosque, where there was constant coming and going and where there was not only the fear that they would distract the worshippers but that they would, otherwise, have no privacy at all. These ideas were, of course, disseminated to women in the popular press and on the radio, which was becoming more and more accessible, even in remote villages. The trend seemed especially strong between the War of Suez (also known, in Egypt, as the Tripartite Aggression) of England, France and Israel against Egypt in October 1956, and the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967. These years were accompanied in Egypt by an almost total state control of the economy and by closer political and economic ties with the Soviet bloc and with "progressive" and neutralist states in Africa and Asia. The trend was assisted by the Agrarian Reform Bill of 1952, further implemented by that of 1961, which broke the power of the land-owning groups and created places for Egyptians by industrialization and by encouraging emigration of the minority groups (Maltese, Greeks, Italians, Syro-Lebanese, Jews and Armenians) who had once played such an active role in urban and business life. Socialism was smart and aping the customs of the decadent colonial societies was not, but the modernization of the role of women (and their dress) was seen as part of this climate and, on the whole, middle-class Egyptian women took full advantage of it.

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These generally known facts have been mentioned to set the stage for the somewhat dramatic contrast in women's appearance that is apparent to a visitor to Egypt today. One is struck by the number of women wearing costumes rather similar to those of Catholic nuns before Vatican II, although their flowing dresses, coifs and long wimples are usually in light rather than dark colors. Occasionally, the old-fashioned *yashmak,* or face-veil, is also seen, though this is rarer. Other women wear pantsuits, often with long jackets and a wimple, or at least a large kerchief on their heads, leaving only the face and the hands uncovered. This costume is not traditional; in its specific form it is new. And it is clearly intended to satisfy the stricter requirements of Islamic Law:

> It is not permitted men to look at strange women, except in the face and palm of the hands . . . It is reported from Abu Hanifa that it is also allowable to look at the feet of a woman, since there is sometimes occasion for it. From Abu Yusuf there is also a tradition that the seeing of the shoulder is also allowed, since from the influence of custom it may be exposed. If, however, a man is not secure from the stirrings of lust, it is not allowable to look even at the face of a woman, except in cases of absolute necessity.
>
> Marghinani's *Hidaya*. Book 44, Section 4.

Since the costumes now worn are in response to an interpretation of the *Shar'*, (the religious Law), they are called, in modern Egypt, *al-zayy al-shar'i* (the Lawful dress).

The women who wear them come from the middle-class, precisely those who until recently followed the drive for modernization, and they include numbers of university students and graduates. Some women students at Cairo University make an effort to persuade their classmates to adopt *zayy shar'i*, and it even appears at the American University in Cairo, which is usually regarded as a bastion of upper-class and cosmopolitan pretensions. The new mode comes at a time when President Sadat has proclaimed the "open-door policy," a return to a greater measure of private initiative, and when Cairo is thronged with foreign visitors and business people, and Egyptians have more opportunity to travel abroad than they had in the Nasser years.

Both the name of the costume and the declarations of women who adopt it make the claim that its wearing is a religious gesture; that it conforms more to the religious law of Islam than any other available dress. Now it could be argued that an orthoprax (i.e., one who follows the Law) Muslim woman could, with equal propriety, wear a simple dress of modern design with long sleeves, black stockings and a scarf tied over her hair, especially if she did without

jewelry or make-up. Indeed, many Muslim Egyptian women of the educated classes have so dressed during the last decades, and do still. Their dress has identified them as observant Muslim women but has not made them conspicuous; many of them are models of piety. Yet increasingly, such simple and modest modern attire is no longer seen as good enough: the woman who appears in *zayy shar'i* is evincing an aspiration to dress counter to recent dress norms and to be more observant of the Law than are other women.

This can certainly be called a reaction against international style or what is called (with increasing inaccuracy) Western dress. Whether this is a reaction against *modernization* is not clear, since it is innovative in its specific form—this is not a return to some costume worn by one's grandmother, it is a modern phenomenon. And this costume certainly entails some sacrifice; it is hot, uncomfortable and more expensive; it is harder to launder and hardly convenient for most of the jobs modern Egyptian women have been taking. Rightly or wrongly, it appears to some segments of modern Egyptian society as a retrograde step. But is it also a reaction against the wider, more liberal and more cosmopolitan life available to Egyptians under Sadat's Open Door policy?

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One may note that the Egyptian case is paralleled by a more fundamentalist orientation in Muslim lands in general in recent years and by a more *shar'i* costume among women all the way from North Africa to Central Asia. However, I submit that this does not take us very far. The *shar'* has been in existence for hundreds of years. Why are Egyptian women, who once led other Muslim women in their desire for "liberation," choosing this time to demonstrate in this conspicuous way an affirmation of *shar'i* norms of dress? Political scientists and anthropologists have noted that nationalistic periods usually see a swing to conservatism in morality. Why, then, did this not occur in the more nationalist Nasserist period of Egyptian society? The Sadat period has seen a resurgence of Egyptian national feelings, as opposed to pan-Arabism. Why are Egyptian women dressing in a manner more likely to conform with ideas about the place and behavior of women in other Arab countries, such as in the Arabian peninsula and Libya, than with those recently prevalent in Egypt?

While it is true that there is also a turning to *shar'i* dress among educated women in Iran there are, apparently, special reasons for this return: a very broadly based movement against a regime held to be corrupt and tyrannical has selected religious values as a rallying point and the shi'i *'ulama'* as a source of legitimization. While the Shah's government and the American media have airily dismissed this as an incomprehensible wave of religious reaction against modernity in general, many of these Iranian women would reply that it has been the Shah, not the veil, that was outworn.

Special reasons also, apparently, apply in Turkey or in Tunisia. We might remark in passing that if a woman chooses to put on a distinctive *shar'i* costume or the veil in a modernizing Muslim country, there is always some personal choice operating: she is making a personal statement, usually connected with her faith. Her choice is not illuminated for us if we simply ascribe it to a worldwide wave of Muslim fundamentalism. On the other hand, if we can understand what is going through her mind, and in what climate her choice operates, we may quite possibly get some useful insight about a worldwide wave of Islamic fundamentalism.

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Egypt is a distinct country. This point must be stressed. However much they may share with their Arab neighbors, Egyptians are aware that in some ultimate sense they are themselves; a special people with a special land and history. They may sympathize keenly with other Arabs, but they will not be ruled by them and they are well aware that they have led their neighbors in many periods of their past.

In the last quarter of a century, the popu-

lation of Egypt has more than doubled. Cairo has grown from a city of about two million to a city of nearly nine million. It is a city bursting at the seams, beset with traffic problems, public transportation problems, housing shortages, a telephone system that scarcely functions any longer, with problems of distribution — with an infrastructure inadequate for the demands that are made upon it. Cairo is, in fact, a showpiece of all the problems that beset a primate city in the Third World. Its problems are aggravated by the constant need, over the last twenty-five years, to be in a posture of defense against the threat and the consequences, thrice experienced, of war with Israel. Egypt's available resources have had to be channelled to arms, the army and payment of Egypt's debt to the Russians for the Aswan High Dam and to industrialization. Cairo has had to be left to shift for itself. Alexandria, though only half the size of Cairo, has found itself in a similar situation. As a result of the 1967 war, the whole population of the Suez Canal zone — nearly one tenth of the population of Egypt — became refugees, and most of them poured into Cairo and Alexandria. As overpopulation has caught up with the rural areas, villagers have been forced to leave the countryside and seek what livelihood they could find in the cities. The rising expectations of a better life that the 1952 Revolution fostered among Egyptians could only find satisfaction in the major cities and, to an unhealthy degree, the new industries have been located near the cities in order to take advantage of the infrastructure already there. The new industries have also brought industrial pollution. Social problems have naturally proliferated. Though they may seem mild to Americans, since actual crimes of violence are rare, crime yet occurs frequently enough in the cities to frighten Egyptians and make them wonder what things are coming to. People no longer have time to be courteous, to visit neighbors, relatives and friends, and are often too short of money or of space to offer much hospitality to friends when they come to visit. Egyptians still strike outsiders as remarkably patient, sunny, amiable and generous people, but all things are relative. People complain of the greed that besets modern society, of the decline in morality and of corruption in high places. Huge fortunes have been made in a few years, primarily by people engaged in import-export businesses or in helping the Saudis and Kuwaytis who flock to Cairo to invest their money (now that Lebanon is no longer available as a place where investors from the oil countries can put their capital). A few Egyptians have a great deal of money and they flaunt it shamelessly — something that was never possible under Abd al-Nasser.

In order to make ends meet, most men have to take a second job and, whenever possible, their wives work also. One may meet minor government officials or teachers who drive a taxi or keep a shop when they are not at the office. They constantly worry about their children's education and try to afford to send them to the few, overcrowded, private schools, for the government schools have classes of fifty to seventy in three daily shifts. They may live in cramped, small apartments in enormously crowded popular housing projects where there is no place but the street for their children to play and high-rise apartment buildings block the view on every side. Even upper-class families are often driven to live with their married children and their grandchildren in one house or apartment because new housing is simply not available, except to the very affluent.

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The modern *shar'i* dress seems to be primarily a middle-class, urban costume. In the villages, the traditional dress (which, of course, covers everything the *shar'i* dress is supposed to cover) still prevails. In small towns, women are still discarding traditional dress for modern dresses or pantsuits. Even in the cities, the daughters of poorer families save their piasters to have a dressmaker run up something snappy and foreign looking. If the family can save enough money to go to the seashore for a week or two in summer, they go to the beach

in attractive bathing suits. The woman who wears *shar'i* dress wears it on the beach also, and at most, does a little wading in her long costume.

Asked why *shar'i* dress is increasing, educated Egyptians are likely to shrug their shoulders, roll their eyes and reply that they can't imagine. Pressed, they often reply that "it's all because of the Saudis." Yet many Saudis come to Cairo to enjoy themselves and are not interested in the sort of girls who wear *shar'i* costumes. True, Egyptians may reply, but the Saudis give a lot of money to writers and *shaykhs* who will further their fundamentalist vision of Islam. There is something in this comment. A woman student at Cairo University stated that she received a small sum of money to hand out head-kerchiefs to her classmates and more money for every woman she converted to the wearing of *shar'i* dress; money that came from a Saudi source. These occurrences are rare, however, and although some Egyptians point to them to explain the movement, they do not sufficiently explain what is happening. Egyptian women, it has been shown, are no sheep. No one is likely to persuade them to exchange the cooler, more comfortable modern dresses for *zayy shar'i* unless they wish to do so. Other people point to the resurgence of fundamentalist Muslim groups on the order of the old Muslim Brotherhood, which are often subsidized by Saudi or Libyan money (by the Libyans for political reasons, in order to oppose the Sadat regime; by the Saudis in order to further the cause of fundamentalist religious reform). Men who join such a group have been known to threaten to divorce their wives if they did not adopt *shar'i* costume. However, it would be quite wrong to imagine that almost every woman in *shar'i* dress has behind her some stern member of the Brotherhood or its offshoots.

I recall a student of mine in Cairo, the very pretty daughter of a prominent father (this is worth mentioning in case anyone thinks that only homely girls are attracted to the covering, or girls of humble background), who appeared one day in class wearing *shar'i* costume. I congratulated her on her new dress and she volunteered that she was now very happy and had a real sense of peace with herself. She said that she had often really not known who she was before; had felt "pulled this way and that," in her effort to "act like other girls." Now, she felt, she had taken her stand; she knew who she was: a Muslim woman. Also, she said young men would not now mistake her for an easy mark; they could see what sort of girl she was. Thus, she had solved some sort of personal identity crisis and she was protecting herself to some extent against the attentions of the persistent men who annoy women in the streets and in the crowded trams and buses of Cairo. This reason is often advanced by women for adopting *shar'i* dress. I have even heard of one or two American girls who, in desperation, resorted to *shar'i* dress to avoid unwelcome attentions. It is a reaction against the aggressiveness of young men who, as a result of the alienation of life in the crowded, faceless city, behave in unacceptable ways, and it is also a reaction against urban alienation among women.

In pursuing the question of why women adopt *shar'i* dress in modern Egypt, it became ever clearer to me that women who did so felt that they were "solving problems." Even those who tended to defend their dress on fundamentalist grounds ("I am a Muslim woman; this is what my faith demands of me") responded somewhat differently when asked what had occasioned their response to a demand that, after all, Islam has appeared to have made for a long time, and which has not always been so clearly heard. I also asked Egyptian friends and colleagues to question women in their own circle of acquaintances as to why they had come to put on *shar'i* dress. Here are some of the answers commonly provided:

- I did it to reject current behavior by young people and contemporary society . . .
- I began to look for something to do after the 1967 war. This seemed to me to be the right thing. When I saw some other women putting on *shar'i* dress, I decided that was what I wanted to do too . . .

> • Until 1967, I accepted the way our country was going. I thought Gamal Abd al-Nasser would lead us all to progress. Then the war showed that we had been lied to; nothing was the way it had been represented. I started to question everything we were told. I wanted to do something and to find my own way. I prayed more and I tried to see what was expected of me as a Muslim woman. Then I put on *shar'i* dress . . .
> • 1967 was the rude awakening. Then in 1973, it seemed that God was answering our prayers. We had become too careless. Now we want to respond to God with faith . . .

Another response often heard was that women had put on *shar'i* dress because they were afraid of *inhilal* (which may be rendered as "dissoluteness" or "disintegration" of society). The personal affirmation involved in *shar'i* dressing thus seemed a way of applying at least some remedy to a society falling apart.

Some women say that they have put on *shar'i* dress in fulfillment of a vow: if God gave them a son or the husband they hoped for, or in some way responded to them in their personal problems, they would put on *shar'i* dress.

One woman said:

> Once we thought that Western society had all the answers for successful, fruitful living. If we followed the lead of the West, we would have progress. Now we see that this isn't true; they (the West) are sick societies; even their material prosperity is breaking down. America is full of crime and promiscuity. Russia is worse. Who wants to be like that? We have to remember God. Look how God has blessed Saudi Arabia. That's because they have tried to follow the Law. And America, with its loose society, is all problems.

Many women who still wear Western clothing said that they were seriously attracted to *zayy shar'i*. They might put it on in the future. They admired the women who had already assumed it. They thought these women had demonstrated strength of character.

A striking comment—with which other women agreed—was made by an educated and intelligent woman, who said:

> There are so many problems in Egypt today that we don't know how to solve. It seems that only God can solve them. We have problems of housing, budgets, schools, transportation, electricity, gas and water, and the telephone doesn't work. When we put on *zayy shar'i*, we feel that at least here is one problem we can help solve for our families and society by ourselves. At least we've done something.

Nearly all of the women questioned maintained that industrialization, technology, education in the sciences are good and also culturally neutral. They saw no reason whatsoever why a change of dress should impede appreciation of these good things, though they often spoke of corruption and false goals in society.

Perhaps a tentative conclusion from all this may be that modernization and political development in the Islamic world are not following the pre-established patterns of America and Europe; that even in a materially poor and traditionally rather hedonistic society such as Egypt's, women—the powerless—still influence policy; that the social models of the West are less attractive than ever and that in matters regarding the family and the structure of society, Muslims will continue to tinker with what they borrow until it feels right.

This article reflects the situation in Egypt in Fall of 1978. Things change rapidly in the modern Middle East. By mid-January of 1979, when I returned briefly to Cairo, it was obvious that what had been a women's movement was now being exploited by men for their own purposes. It is predictable that as women become aware of this, the movement will change its course.

Middle East Journal
Spring 1979

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL AND EGYPT

Bruce M. Borthwick

ALTHOUGH many scholars and journalists have focused on the "religious question" in Israel and the "modernization of Islam" in Egypt, very few have compared these similar struggles over the social and political rôle of religion. I shall make the attempt.

In respect to Israel, numerous writers have focused on the controversies over officially-enforced observance of the Sabbath, state enforcement of the Jewish dietary laws, rabbinic control of marriage and divorce, and the problem of defining "Who is a Jew?". They have pointed to the sharp cleavages in Israeli society between the secularists who do not want the state to enforce Jewish religious law (*halākhah*) and religionists who want just this to be done.[1]

In respect to Egypt, scholars have studied the interaction between Islam and modernism, and have focused on figures such as Muḥammad 'Abduh, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Rashīd Riḍā. Issues that they have dealt with have been the rôle of the Caliphate in the modern age, the viability and applicability of the Islamic religious law (*sharī'ah*) in modern society, the degree to which secular or religious subjects should predominate in the educational system, and the power of the religious scholars (*'ulamā'*) over social and political matters.[2]

A tragedy of the conflict between Israel and Egypt is that people-to-people communication has been almost non-existent. Travel to each other's country has not been permitted and exchanges of scholars and artists have not taken place. Thus, a gap of cultural understanding exists, and the

1. See, Joseph Badi, *Religion in Israel Today: The Relationship Between State and Religion* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1959); Ervin Birnbaum, *The Politics of Compromise: State and Religion in Israel* (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970); and Norman Zucker, *The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1973).

2. See, Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad 'Abduh* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968); Gabriel Baer (ed.), *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); and Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804–1952* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).

BRUCE M. BORTHWICK is associate professor of political science at Albion College, Albion, Michigan. The original version of the paper was prepared and presented at a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Middle Eastern political systems at the University of Texas, Austin, June 13 to August 5, 1977, Professor James Bill, Director.

political and religious leaders in each country have only a vague understanding of the nuances of culture and religion in the other.

This is regrettable, because there are similarities between Israel and Egypt in respect to religion and politics. The Islamic *sharī'ah* and the Jewish *halākhah* are comparable, because both prescribe a total way of life—all the things that individuals and society should and should not do. The Islamic *'ulamā'* and the Jewish rabbis are also comparable, in that neither are priests especially consecrated to the service of God, and both are simply learned men who have spent a lifetime studying the holy scriptures and the religious law. Both are leaders of worship in the mosque or synagogue and at special ceremonies such as marriages and funerals. Another similarity is that both Israel and Egypt have a theocratic past, and an issue in both countries is whether the theocracy of the past should be reinstituted.

Much has been written about secularization, especially that it usually accompanies modernization and that all societies are changing into totally secular ones. Donald Eugene Smith says that the "secularization of the polity has been the most fundamental structural and ideological change in the process of development."[3] He defines secularization as (1) "the separation of the polity from religious ideologies and ecclesiastical structures, (2) the expansion of the polity to perform regulatory functions in the socioeconomic sphere which were formerly performed by religious structures, and (3), the transvaluation of the political culture to emphasize nontranscendent temporal goals and rational, pragmatic means, that is secular political values."[4]

I shall argue that secularization according to this definition is not taking place in either Israel or Egypt. Rather, the societies and politics of both are mixtures of the secular and the religious, and they are likely to remain so. However, the form and substance of the mix are much different in each because of varying legacies from the past and different contemporary social and political systems.

Smith describes four patterns of secularization: (1) polity-separation secularization, where church and state become separated, (2) polity-expansion secularization, where the polity extends its jurisdiction into areas of social and economic life formerly regulated by religious structures, (3) polity-transvaluation secularization, which involves the secularization of the political culture, and (4) polity-dominance secularization, which involves an open government attack on the religious basis of general culture and the forcible imposition of a secular ideology on the political culture.[5]

Pattern 1 is not taking place in Israel or Egypt, because a separate autonomous "church" has never existed in either country. Likewise, number 4 is

3. Donald Eugene Smith, *Religion and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 2.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 91–123.

not taking place, because in both countries, the political authorities do not want to wipe out and destroy religion. In Israel, even among the most rabid secularists, there is a grudging acceptance of the fact that religion in some way contributes to the Jewish character of the state. In Egypt, the Nāṣir-Sādāt governments have eschewed secularism. Something akin to patterns 2 and 3 is taking place, and I shall now proceed to examine each country in respect to these two categories.

Israel

Polity-Expansion Secularization

In societies undergoing this form of secularization, the polity expands at the expense of religion. It is a zero-sum game, and what the polity wins, religion loses. The struggle usually takes place in four areas: legal, educational, social and economic. Religious law, once all-encompassing and enforced by the state, is restricted to a smaller and smaller domain. The educational system, once controlled by religious officials and overwhelmingly religious in content is progressively secularized and put in the hands of secular authorities. Also, the struggle revolves around the structure of society, with the religious leaders in some countries legitimizing a hierarchical society, while secularists advocate an egalitarian society. Furthermore, in some countries, religious institutions frequently own large quantities of land and thus wield great economic power. In societies undergoing polity-expansion secularization, this economic domain of religious institutions is progressively diminished.[6]

The history of Israel since 1948 indicates that polity-expansion secularization has not taken place. The Jewish pioneers who came to Eretz Israel between 1905 and 1914, and who after World War II founded and led the state, were "Labor-Zionists." Their ideology was a blend of socialism and Jewish nationalism, and their objective was to establish in the land of Israel a democratic, egalitarian, secular, nationalist Jewish state. However, both in the period of the mandate and of the state, the Labor-Zionist parties and organizations have not been able to predominate in an overwhelming way. Thus, the leading Labor-Zionist party, Mapai, and its successor, the Israel Labor Party, were never able to achieve a popular majority in the elections nor a majority of seats in Parliament, so it had to govern in coalition, and it usually chose as its coalition partner the National Religious Party. In 1977, Labor for the first time failed to win a plurality, but the party that did succeed, Likud, also did not have a majority and had to govern in coalition with the National Religious Party. The latter has always struck a hard

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 96–113.

sure that Israel is a Jewish state, and not simply a state in which a lot of Jews live, religion must in some way be a part of national life.

While the connection between the Jewish nation and the Jewish religion has been very strong and continuous, that between the Jewish state and the Jewish religion has been weak and not continuous. Throughout history, Jews often have lived in bondage or under the dominion of foreign powers. For about 1900 years prior to the establishment of modern Israel, they were living in the Middle East, Europe and the world amidst other peoples and under foreign laws and governments. Depending on the times and the state in which they were living, they were allowed to govern themselves in varying degrees, and rabbis were always the leaders of these semi-autonomous communities. However, while the rabbis were the leaders of their communities, they did not possess state power; they could never, through the police power or military might, enforce their decisions. Thus, Jewish communal life was free, pluralistic and consensual. Social order was maintained through use of reason and logic in long involved argumentations, and through appeal to loyalty to family, kin and the community at large.

This self government is a legacy to modern Israel from the period of the Diaspora. At the time of its foundation, Jews were used to governing themselves without a state, and they were not going to tolerate excesses by one now. Thus, an unusual situation was created: a state precariously governed by the secular Labor-Zionist party balanced off by well organized and strong religious organizations. The result has been an equilibrium in which neither the secularists nor the religionists ever completely get their way.

Egypt

In contrast to Israel, Egypt has, throughout most of its history, had a strong centralized state. The Egyptian people have been packed together in the Nile Valley, and it has been relatively easy for the central authorities to control them. Under Nāṣir, all significant economic, social and political institutions were taken under the control of the state, including institutionalized religion, such as mosques, mosque officials (preachers, *imāms*, muezzins), religious schools, religious foundations (*awqāf*) and voluntary benevolent societies. Al-Azhar, the thousand-year-old Islamic seminary and university in Cairo renowned throughout the Islamic world, was completely brought under state control. Morroe Berger, who has studied this trend in Egypt, has said:

> Following a Near Eastern tradition, (the Egyptian government) has repeatedly chosen to emphasize control rather than to encourage incentives and spontaneity.
>
> If . . . it is characteristic of *Islam* that it should produce many voluntary associations for social and religious ends, it may be characteristic of the *Near East* that govern-

ment should aim so persistently to control such associations and that they should soon succumb to political power.[21]

However, this enlarged state control over religion has not brought about secularization. To use the phraseology of Donald Eugene Smith, the polity has expanded, but secularization has not taken place. To rework his term, what we have in Egypt is polity-expansion sacralization. All of the state expansion has been in the name of religion, not against it. The Egyptian leaders, military officers and technocrats, have been practicing Muslims, and they have felt that the religious officials and institutions were old fashioned, obscurantist and obstructionist and unsuited for the modern age. So they have replaced officials who did not adhere to the interpretation of Islam of the leadership class, and they have shaken up and transformed religious institutions so that they could propagate their new modern version of Islam. The leaders regard themselves as protectors and defenders of the faith, and in expanding state control over religious institutions and officials, they feel that they have been making Islam stronger.

Polity-Expansion Secularization

In order to understand what has happened in Egypt under the revolutionary régime, one must examine the relation between religion and state in Islamic countries throughout history. Donald Eugene Smith categorizes the traditional Islamic religio-political system as organic, one in which religious and political functions were fused and were performed by a unitary structure. The ruler exercised both temporal and spiritual authority, and his chief function was to maintain the divine social order according to the sacred law.[22] Beginning with Muḥammad, state and religion have been one, and religious institutions and officials have been as fully a part of the state as the army and generals.

In theory, the people, *'ulamā'* and the rulers were under the *sharī'ah*. The *'ulamā'* studied the Holy Qur'ān, the *Sunnah* and the *sharī'ah*, and interpreted them for individuals and for the community. The ruler, whether caliph, sultan, amir, shaykh or king, was responsible for enforcing the holy law. Together, *'ulamā'* and rulers attempted to create the ideal Islamic community. They were dependent upon each other, for the rulers needed the *'ulamā'* to interpret the law, and the *'ulamā'* needed the rulers to enforce it.*

In reality, the ruler dominated the *'ulamā'*. He had behind him the army,

21. *Islam in Egypt Today: Social and Political Aspects of Popular Religion* (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), p. 130.

22. Donald Eugene Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

* Please note this important difference between the rôle of rabbis and of *'ulamā'* in traditional society. Rabbis in the Diaspora had no Jewish state institutions to enforce their interpretation of the holy law. The *'ulamā'* had Islamic ones.

while the *'ulamā'* had no military power of their own, nor did they have any autonomous religious institutions from which they could wield power. They simply tried to manipulate the ruler and to influence state and society through their teachings and pronouncements. They were the great legitimizers of political power, approving of any ruler so long as he recognized the superiority of the *sharī'ah* and consulted with them on matters of law. As long as the state recognized the theoretical superiority of God's law, the *'ulamā'* were willing to stretch the interpretation of the law to please the rulers. Tensions often arose between *'ulamā* and rulers, but the latter usually won out.

In fighting Shi'ism and the excesses of popular religion, the Sunnī *'ulamā'* relied on the state. They had a monopoly on all official religious positions, and they controlled the mosques, *kuttābs,* and *madrasahs* and through them they attempted to hold in check heresy and popular cults. However, the Sunnī *'ulamā'* paid a price, for in return they were expected to preach obedience to the ruler, however unjust he might be. This they did.

The traditional Islamic state was both the patron and the master of religious officials, religious institutions, the religiously-run educational system and the legal system based on the holy law. While religious officials and institutions gained money and backing from the state, they lost their independence and autonomy *vis-à-vis* it. It is not surprising that in Egypt today, the military leaders should continue this relationship, which is to their advantage, but with a new twist: now it is the modern Islam of the rulers that is to be propagated and enforced, not the more traditional Islam of the *'ulamā'*.[23]

Religious Reform in Egypt Since the Revolution

The young officers who took control of Egypt in 1952 confronted a difficult situation in respect to religion. Although several of them had associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and although some could be characterized as "Leftists," they were generally middle-of-the-roaders who wanted to steer clear of the reaction and fundamentalism of the Brotherhood and the nonbelief and secularism of the Marxists. However, of these two forces, clearly the Brotherhood represented the greatest threat to them, for it was a widespread, mass based, popular, religious, social and political movement that appealed to the deep seated Islamic beliefs and emotions of the Egyptian masses. The Marxists were much fewer in number and were principally urban middle class types.

After a brief period in which the officers and the Brotherhood attempted to work together, the latter became increasingly antagonistic to the régime

23. Daniel Crecelius, "The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt," in *Religion and Political Modernization,* ed. Donald Eugene Smith (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 68–73.

and started to use violence. In 1954, some of its members attempted to assassinate Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir. He responded by outlawing the organization and arresting its leaders and activists. What was once the most well-organized and widespread organization in Egypt was suppressed.

'Abd al-Nāṣir was now able to shape the religious policy of the Egyptian state by himself. The essence of his policy was to bring all religious institutions under state control and to have them espouse a version of Islam that would appeal to both the conservative masses who had been influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and to the more modern, but still religious, middle class.

The *awqāf* were the first semi-autonomous religious institutions to be brought under state control. The officers felt that their reform was a prerequisite to land reform, for through this system large areas of land had been set aside, the revenues from which were used to support mosques and religious institutions. There were several types (personal, public and mixed), and all were either abolished or brought under the control of the Ministry of *awqāf*.[24]

The *sharī'ah* courts were the next religious institutions due for reform. Since the latter part of the 19th century, the Egyptian judicial system had been a crazy-quilt pattern of (1) mixed courts which tried cases involving resident aliens in Egypt or between a resident alien and an Egyptian, (2) Egyptian secular courts based on Western law, (3) *sharī'ah* courts which dealt with marriage, divorce and inheritance for Muslims and (4) the religious courts of the minorities that dealt with the same matters according to each community's laws and traditions. The mixed courts were eliminated as a result of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954, and the *sharī'ah* and religious courts of the minorities were absorbed into the state secular system as of January 1, 1956. These courts now enforced the *sharī'ah*, but only in respect to matters of personal status. Egypt now had one unified state judicial system.[25]

Beginning in 1961, the government imposed a reform on al-Azhar, the last stronghold of the conservative *'ulamā'*. By law, it was attached to the Presidency of the Republic, and a Minister of al-Azhar Affairs was appointed by the President. Its various departments were placed under the leadership of men from outside the ranks of the *'ulamā'*, its curriculum was reformed, and four modern secular faculties (Medicine, Engineering, Agriculture, Commerce) were added. A girls college was established with its own branch of studies.[26] Simultaneously, a withering attack was leveled against the *'ulamā'* through the media; they were charged with being old fashioned,

24. Gabriel Baer, *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 79–92.
25. Nadav Safran, "The Abolition of the Sharia Courts in Egypt," *Muslim World*, Vol. 48 (Jan. 1958): 20–28, 125–135.
26. *Majallat al-Azhar* (Cairo), June 1970, pp. 1–4.

obstructionist, obscurantist and of forming a "priestly" caste. They were also charged with being unable to deal with modern times, and this, the government said, was turning people away from Islam.

Under a law promulgated in 1960 but not implemented until after 1973, the Ministry of *Awqāf* was directed to take charge of all mosques in the country. It already had about 4000 "public" mosques under its administration, but there were at least 15,000 "private" mosques and thousands of prayer rooms (*zāwiyahs*) not under its jurisdiction. The rationale behind this law was explained in a clarifying memorandum:

> It has been observed that many mosques were not subject to the supervision of the Ministry of Waqfs, and that the affairs of these mosques are left up to chance. Since the continuation of this situation may lessen the value of religious guidance and weaken confidence in the mission of mosques—especially since what is said in the pulpits of the mosques is said in the name of God—circumstances make it necessary to lay down a statute for the supervision of these mosques, in such a way as to assure the achievement of the lofty goals of general religious instruction, the correct orientation of the rising generation, and its protection from all alien thought.[27]

Or as a Parliamentary Report said: "the Ministry was to take charge of the administration of the mosques . . . and of guiding the leaders in such a way that they (the mosques) would fulfill their religious mission in the proper way."[28]

In 1954, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt founded the Islamic Congress, which was to be an international organization defending and promoting Islam. In the mid-1950s, Anwar al-Sādāt was its secretary general. Because of differences among the three governments sponsoring it, its effectiveness was soon diminished, but Egypt by itself realized the potential of such an organization and in 1960 founded, on its own, the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs. This body has as its general purpose the promotion of Islam and of a better understanding of Islam. It sponsors international conferences, brings students to Cairo to study religious subjects, and issues numerous publications in Arabic and other languages on Islamic subjects. Its director is a former army officer, and many of the contributors to its publications are non *'ulamā'* such as university professors and state officials.[29]

This study of Egypt shows that the state is still both the patron and the master of religion. The expansion of the state has not meant an increase in secularism, but rather, the emergence of a new "established" Islam, that of the military leaders. In Islamic countries, there has always been a difference

27. As quoted in "Excerpts from the Report of the Parliamentary Committee Investigating the Sectarian Incidents in Egypt," in *CEMAM Reports* (Center for the Study of the Modern Arab World, Saint Joseph's University, Beirut), Vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1972–73): 21–22.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

29. Crecelius, *op. cit.*, p. 89, and "Die Religion in Dienst des Islamischen Staatssozialismus in Ägypten," *Bustan* (Vienna), Vol. 3 (1967): 13–20.

between the "high" Islam of the state and the "low" Islam or popular religion of the masses; this split continues in Egypt today, but with the difference that the "high" Islam has been adapted to modern society and thinking. As Daniel Crecelius says:

> None of the Islamic institutions in Egypt has retained its traditional form. The sultanate-caliphate has disappeared altogether, the ulama have lost their monopoly over the interpretation of Allah's law and education, institutions such as waqf or the shari'ah have been radically changed, and classical religio-political concepts have been rejected or seriously reworked. Yet for all this change, Egypt remains an Islamic state, secular in part, but nevertheless preserving the one vital link that connects state and society to God. Even as it changes the shari'ah in a drastic manner and expands the sources from which legal principles can be drawn, it does not repudiate the *theoretical* primacy of the shari'ah and continues to argue that *shari'ah* principles govern the *ummah*.[30]

Polity-Transvaluation Secularization

This pattern involves secularization of the political culture, of the basis of legitimacy of the state, government, and of political leaders, and it involves secularization of the sources of group identity. In Egypt, none of this has taken place, and political culture, governmental legitimacy and national identity are all infused with Islam.

Islam is more than simply the religion of the state. It is faith that permeates the society, and it is the faith which the government propagates and supports. It is the faith which the leaders of the country practice and with which they identify. From all of this the government gains legitimacy and more widespread acceptance of its revolutionary programs.

Attending the Friday worship service is a common practice of the government leaders. On a few occasions of national crisis, Nāṣir himself even ascended the pulpit and delivered the sermon. Every week, a government ministry in Cairo prepares a model sermon and then distributes it to the preachers throughout the country who either read it or put its contents and meaning into their own words. In them, government policies are espoused and backed up with quotations from the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. The government solicits from the *'ulamā'* formal legal opinions (*fatwās*) on a wide range of subjects, including birth control, land reform, nationalization, scientific research, foreign policy and social affairs. Hundreds of inexpensive tracts and books written by Azhar shaykhs and others are sold throughout the country on religious, social and political subjects. Religious instruction is offered in all the public schools, and a revival of religion among Muslims and Copts, especially among the youth, is taking place. Muslim Sufī fraternities are increasing in numbers and in membership.[31] The code name for

30. "The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt," *op. cit.*, p. 93.
31. *CEMAM Reports*, Vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1972–73): 159.

the surprise attack across the Suez Canal in 1973 was "Operation Badr," named after an important battle Muḥammad fought and won against the Meccans. All of these are indications that religious practice and religious value are a part of the warp and woof of the society.

The official ideology of Egypt is Arab socialism, but the government also allows a doctrine called Islamic socialism to be espoused and regards the two as complementary. Islamic socialism is an intellectual argument asserting that socialism is supported and sustained by the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* and is the natural economic and political order for Muslims. It also asserts that Islam supports the principles on which socialism is based: equality, the use of property for the common good, social harmony and social justice. Therefore, Muslims should support socialism and participate in socialist institutions.[32]

The Egyptian constitution deals with religion in several places and definitely establishes religion as a part of both the society and state. It should be looked at not so much for its commands and limitations on political behavior, but for its expression of the ideals and values of the leadership class that wrote it.[33] Article 2 states that "Islam is the religion of the state," and that the "principles of the Islamic *Sharī'ah* are a major source of legislation." The latter clause was the subject of considerable debate with various persons advocating that the *Sharī'ah* should be "the sole source," "the source" or "a source" of legislation. It is significant that the weakest of these three possibilities was included in the constitution, and that the more conservative religious forces insisted that at least the principle be maintained that legislation is derived from the Islamic holy law.[34] Article 12 deals with matters of morality and states: "Society will be committed to caring for morals and protecting them and strengthening authentic Egyptian traditions. Society will abide by the high standard of religious education, moral and patriotic values, the people's historic heritage, scientific facts, socialist conduct, and public ethics within the law." To make this a reality, Article 19 prescribes religious instruction in the public schools.

What goes under the name of civics or social studies in American schools, and might more bluntly be called political indoctrination, takes place in Egypt in the courses on religion. Politics is regarded largely as moral education, and since Islam has always been both a faith and a social and political order, it is not out of place to have political education be one aspect of religious education. In the religious texts now used, 72 per cent of the content is devoted to political and social matters, if one leaves out the

32. See excerpts from the book *Islamic Socialism* by Mustafa al-Sibā'ī in Sami A. Hanna and George H. Gardner, *Arab Socialism* (Leiden: Brill, 1969), pp. 66–79.

33. The complete text is in the *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 26 (Winter 1972): 55–68.

34. Joseph P. O'Kane, "Islam in the New Egyptian Constitution: Some Discussions in al-Ahrām," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 26 (Spring 1972): 137–148.

material that is straight scriptural quotation.[35] During 1958 and 1959, the texts for the schools were revised, and as stated in the prefaces of some, their objective was to inculcate in the pupils "a sincere faith, inclined to build a society on the firm foundation of true democracy and authentic socialism, and to place into operation the efficacious cooperation called for by Islam."[36]

Socialism is dealt with under Islam, and the authors never speak of it in secular terms. The texts do not articulate a philosophy of socialism but a "Muslim theology of socialism."[37] They say that Islam advocates socialism, because it is the political system that applies the value of "solidarity-coöperation" as well as that of democracy.[38] They say that the great virtues of socialism are equality, fraternity and liberty, derived from human nature and endorsed by Islam. Political power is described almost exclusively in Islamic terms, and it is stated that it should not be personal but in the service of the nation. A frequently used term is the "Islamic state," led by a head of state. He is responsible for the maintenance of social justice and civil order. He appoints and directs the high administrators, directs the economy but does not enrich himself, and forms the foreign policy. While the people choose him, his power comes from God. He should be a believer, for everything that he has comes from God. God requires that he be just, defend and extend the Muslim *ummah* and conduct the holy way (*jihād*). He should not be intolerant, nor should the people regard him as God; rather he should submit to consultation (*shūrā*) for every decision.[39] *Shūrā* is presented as a principle, and the method of carrying it out, whether through a parliament or through the cabinet, is left up to the head of state.

The texts say that the Muslim *ummah* is superior to the Arab nation and the country of Egypt. However, the Arab nation and culture should work for the good of the Muslim *ummah*. Arab unity is regarded as an essential article of the Islamic faith. One text gives this invocation:

> O God! Bring to us unity! O God! Re-unite the Arabs in one nation. When that happens . . . , they will form the most powerful, the richest, the most knowledgeable and the most important of nations![40]

The mystique of the Muslim *ummah* and of the Arab nation intermesh and reinforce each other. As Oliver Carré says: "The texts call young Egyptians to feel and think of themselves as Arabs above all and to apply to their Arabism their sense of identity with the Muslim *ummah*."[41]

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35. Olivier Carré, "L'Idéologie politico-religieuse nasserienne à la lumière des manuels scolaires," *Politique Etrangère* (Paris), Vol. 37 (1972): 536.
36. *Ibid.*, as quoted on p. 536.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 538.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 542–543.
40. *Ibid.*, as quoted on p. 546.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 546.

President Sādāt and other high ranking officials have repeatedly said that the Egyptian state and society rely on "faith and science." This has been said so often that it can be considered a slogan of the government. Seven Egyptian intellectuals discussed this theme in the March 1973 issue of *al-Kātib,* a long established Egyptian literary monthly.[42] All but two said that religion could play a positive rôle in modern society. Kamāl al-Dīn Rif'āt, former minister, diplomat and political theorist, said: "Religion has basic functions in society," one being that "spiritual values are the basis of the human and moral values on which socialist conduct stands."[43] Dr. Muḥammad Aḥmad Khalafallāh, a shaykh, said that: "If we really want to bring the Arab masses out of the state of backwardness into a state of progress then we must tie the future to the heritage and we must build progress on the basis of religion—especially since we know that there is no opposition between science which makes for progress and the *Qur'ān* which encourages science."[44]

All of the participants felt that Islam could promote progress, develop a willingness to sacrifice, generate enthusiasm, encourage good works, and restrain popular emotions and passions. They did not desire to establish a secular world, rather they wanted to mark off a world of Islam, true and free from superstition. As the preface to the article in *al-Kātib* said: "In the campaigns which Gamal Abdel-Nasser undertook, religion was purified from superstition and from the irrational tendency which was trading in religion for non-religious purposes."[45]

Conclusion

Events in the period of January through July 1977 revealed the depth of repressed religious emotions in Egypt and the fact that the government faced serious trouble from Islamic rightists who felt that the reformed Islam of the state was inadequate and untrue. Deputies in the People's Assembly called for state laws to enforce the traditional Islamic religious laws, such as a total ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages. In July, Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, a former Minister of *Awqāf,* and thus a representative of the official religious élite which Nāṣir has installed and supported, was kidnapped and killed by members of an organization called *Takfīr wa Hijrah* ("Penance and Retreat"). It felt that present day Arab society deviated from true Islam, and taught that people should go into retreat (*hijrah*) in parts of the Islamic world untouched by modernism, such as southern Arabia, there to seek spiritual rejuvenation as Muḥammad did on his original *hijrah* from Mecca to Medina.[46] The government imprisoned many members of

42. "Religion and Scientific Method in Islam," translated and commented upon in *CEMAM Reports,* Vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1972–73): 159–197.
43. *Ibid.,* p. 179.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.,* p. 162.
46. *Middle East Intelligence Survey* (Tel Aviv), Vol. 5, no. 7 (July 1–15, 1977), pp. 49–51.

the organization. The events taken together revealed that the official Islam of the state was not satisfying all, and that the forces wanting a more traditional state-enforced and guided Islamic society were still strong.

Most students of modernization assert that secularization must take place psychologically and intellectually as well as politically and economically and that all aspects of society must change. This has not happened in Egypt. The military leaders, technocrats and *'ulamā'* at the top of the society as well as less-well-placed more traditional religious leaders are unalterably opposed to any change that would end the religious-political synthesis of the universal and eternal *ummah*. The identity of the Egyptian nation, the legitimacy of the state, the character of the society are all intertwined with religion. The government feels that religion is in its essence "progressive," but "reaction" has covered up its progressive quality, and it believes that reformed Islam can promote national unity, economic development, political development and social change.

Similarities and Differences Between Israel and Egypt

In both Israel and Egypt, secular and religious, temporal and spiritual mix. Neither country is a theocracy, and neither is a secular state.

In Israel, the dispute over the social and political rôle of religion is largely one between believers and non-believers, and the warring parties tend to be, on the one hand, very religious, or on the other hand, hostile or neutral to religion. In Egypt, conservative religious leaders and groups, some operating underground, charge that Nāṣir and Sādāt have, through their reforms, destroyed Islam and Islamic society. The leadership of the Egyptian government responds by saying that Islam is stronger than ever in Egypt, and that furthermore it is compatible with the modern world. What distinguishes this debate from the religious debate in Israel is that it is between two groups both of which say that they are religious, whereas in Israel it is between forces intensely in favor of religion and those hostile or neutral to it.

We have seen that with the Jews the link between the nation and the religion has been strong and that this link continues today, even though religion may sometimes be more of a form of patriotism than worship of God. Religion increases "Jewish awareness" and contributes to the "Jewish character in the society." With the Egyptians the relation between religion and nation is much more amorphous. Egyptian Muslims are members of the Egyptian fatherland (*waṭan*), the Arab nation (*ummah*), and the Islamic community (*ummah*). Islam is a universal religion encompassing persons of all nationalities and races, and it does not enhance loyalty to Egypt exclusively; rather it calls upon Egyptian Muslims to look beyond their own nation state. However, in this supra-Egyptian loyalty, Islam and Arabism tend to merge, and service to Arabism is considered service to Islam and *vice-versa*.

This is fundamentally different from Israel, because Judaism is a national religion, and it inspires no loyalty above the state and nation of Israel.

Judaism and Islam have traditionally been both a religion and a way of life. Today in Israel, the secularists are struggling to keep religion out of certain spheres of life. In Egypt secularists of this type are not strong, and rather power is in the hands of Islamic modernizers, who are following in the tradition of Muḥammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā. They claim that they are not breaking the traditional unity of Islam with all aspects of life, and they say that they are simply applying Islam in a way suitable for the modern world, but the reality is that much that they do under the name of Islamic reform is close to secularism.

Perhaps I can conclude by saying that much of Egypt that appears religious is secular, and much in Israel that appears secular is religious.